Carbon market and climate negotiations. by Shaw, Suzanne & De Perthuis, Christian
Programme de Recherche en Economie du Climat 
Chaire Finance et Développement Durable de l’Université Paris-Dauphine et de l’Ecole Polytechnique 
Les Cahiers du PREC 
 
Carbon Market and Climate Negotiations 
Christian de Perthuis
1 and Suzanne Shaw
2  
  The paper gives an overview of the various types of economic instruments 
used to tackle environmental problems: regulation, taxes and tradable permits; tra-
cing their origin in economic theory and giving concrete examples of their application 
in the context of national and international efforts in environmental protection, and 
more particularly, in climate change mitigation. Specific attention is given to the eco-
nomic instruments incorporated in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: emissions trading, and 
emissions reduction project financing. 
  While Copenhagen did not deliver the international climate agreement hoped 
for, in the run up to the next round of negotiations in Mexico 2010, decision makers 
continue to discuss the fate of the international climate change effort post-2012. Car-
bon markets, while instruments for inciting efficient emissions reductions, also facili-
tate the emergence of compromise and will thus play a key role in these international 
negotiations.  
PREC 
n° 3  •  mars 2010 
Série Information et débats  
1.  Professeur ￠ l’Université Paris Dauphine et directeur du PREC 
christian.deperthuis@prec-climat.org 
 
2.  Doctorante et chef de projet au PREC  
suzanne.shaw@prec-climat.org Carbon Market and Climate Negotiations 
 
 
Christian de Perthuis and Suzanne Shaw 
 
 
Abstract: In the wake of the Copenhagen Conference and the outstanding issue of shaping 
climate change mitigation for the period beyond that covered by the Kyoto protocol, this 
paper puts into context the the various economic instruments available for tackling climate 
change, and highlights the emergence, as a result of the framework of instruments provided 
by the Kyoto Protocol, of carbon markets, an important basis in post-2012 negotiations.  
The paper gives an overview of the various types of economic instruments used to 
tackle environmental problems: regulation, taxes and tradable permits; tracing their origin in 
economic theory and giving concrete examples of their application in the context of national 
and international efforts in environmental protection, and more particularly, in climate change 
mitigation.  Specific  attention  is  given  to  the  economic  instruments  incorporated  in  the 
implementation  of  the  Kyoto  Protocol  to  the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on 
Climate  Change:  emissions  trading,  and  emissions  reduction  project  financing.  This  gave 
impetus to the creation, respectively, of the European Emissions Trading Scheme and the 
international Kyoto projects market, currently the two principal carbon pricing mechanisms 
worldwide.  
 The  European  Emissions  Trading  Scheme  is  the  first  large-scale  carbon  trading 
system worldwide, and an international benchmark for the price of carbon. Experiences from 
the implementation and operation of the European carbon market provide valuable insight for  
European and non-European actors and a concrete tool which the European Union can use in 
its continued efforts in climate change mitigation, which extend well beyond the 2012 period 
envisaged by the Kyoto Protocol. In the case of the international projects market, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) is currently the dominant component. The CDM provides 
the only link between industrialised countries of the north and the developing countries of the 
south in international climate negotiations.  
While Copenhagen did not deliver the international climate agreement hoped for, in 
the run up to the next round of negotiations in Mexico 2010,decision makers continue to 
discuss the fate of the international climate change effort post-2012. Carbon markets, while 
instruments  for  inciting  efficient  emissions  reductions,  also  facilitate  the  emergence  of 
compromise and will thus play a key role in these  international negotiations. 
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The Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997 established commitments aimed at implementing 
the objectives of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
1  
The Protocol defines fixed objectives for the 38 most industrialized countries (listed in Annex 
B  of  the  Protocol)  to  collectively  reduce  by  at  least  5%  their  overall  emissions  of  6 
greenhouse  gases  in  relation  to  1990  levels.  Non -Annex  B  countries  do  not  have  set 
objectives. These reductions must occur over the period 2008-2012. The United States is the 
only developed country which has not ratified the Protocol. The commitment period covered 
by the Kyoto protocol expires in December 2012. The rules that will then apply  were the 
subject of discussion at the Conference of the Parties (COP)
2 in Copenhagen in December 
2009, and will continue to be at the core of international climate change negitations up to and 
during the next COP in Mexico end -2010. The challenge is to ext end the greenhouse gas 
emissions commitment in order to lower the current trajectory of world emissions. Despite the 
current divergence of positions in the post-2012 negotiations, it is important to recognise the 
role of the Kyoto Protocol in enabling the setting up of economic instruments, leading to the 
emergence of a price on a greenhouse gas emissions. Two main systems have been set up in 
line with the Kyoto Protocol instruments: the European system of emission trading  and the 
international system of emissions reduction projects. Experience with these systems provide a 
solid basis for pursuing negotations towards a more ambitious climate agreement. 
 
1. Free use of the atmosphere: a tragedy of the commons 
 
In his celebrated essay The Tragedy of the Commons, Garret Hardin describes the 
predation  mechanisms  on  natural  resources  resulting  from  the  fact  they  are  free  (Hardin, 
1968). He draws on the example of the shared pastures surrounding English villages up until 
the end of the 18th century. Under this system, each herdsman had access to the “common'' 
for grazing his stock. In a situation of demographic stagnation and with few animals per 
hectare, this social system provided villagers with a degree of security. Everyone had free 
access to a shared resource. 
In  a  growth  situation,  this  system  tended  to  self-destruct:  because  access  to  the 
common was free, no herdsman took account, in his economic calculations, of the cost his 
individual  use  of  the  resource  imposed  on  the  community.  It  was  in  each  herdsman's 
economic interest to graze his livestock as long as a positive marginal revenue remained, i.e. a 
few blades of grass remained in the pasture. The inevitable outcome is overgrazing, which 
reduces the fertility of the pasturage to zero and leads to the destruction of the collective 
resource. 
To understand the economic problem presented by climate change, one simply has to 
replace  the  words  “village''  and  “common''  in  Hardin's  example  with  “planet''  and 
“atmosphere''. The growth in the number of inhabitants of the planet and their enrichment 
threatens a very special collective good: the stability of the climate. The atmosphere is not 
infinite, any more than was the common pasturage. Its capacity to regulate temperatures is 
therefore altered by the accumulation of our waste greenhouse gases. Yet, like the members of 
the village community, so long as the free and mode of usage of our atmosphere remains for 
the most part free and unlimited, we have no economic incentive to reduce emissions. But 
                                                 
1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the primary international treaty on global 
climate  change.    Signed  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  in  1992,  the  Convention’s objective  is  the  “stabilization  of  greenhouse  gas 
concentrations  in  the  atmosphere  at  a  level  that  would  prevent  dangerous  anthropogenic  interference  with  the  climate 
system.” See the UNFCCC’s website: www.unfccc.int  
2 The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the supreme body of the UNFCCC. It currently meets once a year to review the 
Convention's progress. Source www.unfccc.int   because  of  the  inertia  of  the  climate  system,  it  is  not  our  generation  that  will  suffer  the 
consequences of the emissions it produces, but future generation ones. 
In order to escape the “tragedy'' described by Hardin, the villagers can first of all 
organize themselves to limit the use of the pasture, for example by setting of a rotation system 
for grazing. To make the system effective, common rules must be established and necessarily 
adhered  to.  Its  implementation  will  limit  the  freedom  of  action  of  each  villager.  It  will 
probably include a sanctions mechanism for anyone breaking the rules. This first type of 
arrangement constitutes a regulations-based approach. 
At the international level, a regulations-based approach was adopted to combat the 
destruction of the ozone layer. The 1987 Montreal Protocol gradually banned the use of CFC 
gases in their main industrial applications. It was considered an effective response by the 
international community: according to the fourth report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), CFC emissions were reduced from 7.5 billion tonnes  2 CO eq
3 to 1.5 
billion tonnes in 2004. If the Kyoto protocol , which regulates emissions of carbon dioxide 
( 2 CO ) and five other greenhouse gases over the period 2008-2012, were to have a similar 
impact, the trajectory of global emissions would be considerably changed. But this will not 
happen.  Due  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  United  States  in  2001  and  the  very  generous 
concessions made to Russia and Ukraine, the implementation of the protocol will have only a 
minor  effect,  if  any,  on  the  trajectory  of  global  2 CO   emissions.  Its  contribution  is  of  a 
different nature. It is through its role in the emergence of a price for carbon emissions that its 
implementation has made itself felt. 
 
2. Taxes or permits? 
 
A second possible mechanism for protecting the communal pasturage would be to 
introduce a levy that would apply to any villager wishing to use the collective asset. The rate 
of the levy would need to be set in such a way that its cost causes the number of livestock to 
automatically adjust to the amount of forage that the communal pasture can produce on a 
sustainable  basis.  Introducing  this  levy  will  have  redistributive  effects:  its  payment  will 
exclude the poorest villagers' animals from the pasturage. On the other hand, the revenues 
obtained can be allocated to programs of value to the community. In this case, the levy will 
bring a second benefit, a “double dividend'' in economists' terminology, to the community. 
This aspect of the levy corresponds to the logic of introducing a tax. 
The use of a tax for protecting environmental resources was advocated as early as the 
1920s  by  the  English  economist  Pigou.  His  idea  was  to  protect  environmental  assets  by 
incorporating them into the production cost of goods, by including, in addition to the standard 
elements of production cost, an estimation of the social cost incurred by the use of or damage 
to environmental assets as a result of the production process. This pricing of environmental 
externalities  by  means  of  the  tax  allows  a  price  to  be  given  for  the  protection  of  the 
environment. This particular route, as a way of confronting climate change, has not been 
taken  at  an  international  level,  despite  being  recommended  by  a  number  of  economists. 
However,  some  European  countries,  namely  Sweden,  Norway,  Denmark  and  more 
recentlyIreland have introduced such carbon taxes into their domestic legislation, soon to be 
joined by France. 
                                                 
3CFC emissions were regulated by the Montreal Protocol to stop the destruction of the ozone layer. CFCs are 
also greenhouse gases. The application of the Montreal Protocol thus contributes to action against greenhouse 
gas emissions when CFCs are not replaced by substitutes that also contribute to the greenhouse effect. It is 
customary to convert non- 2 CO  greenhouse gas emissions into carbon equivalent tonnes, known as  2 CO eq, on 
the basis of their warming power over 100 years. The third possible arrangement is to create a market which will yield a price for the 
common good one wishes to protect. This is the route that has historically been taken, not 
only in England, but in the majority of European countries in the early days of the industrial 
revolution. The traditional organization of the village with its common pastures was gradually 
replaced by a system of private land ownership. This transformation was produced by the 
“enclosures'' movement, which appeared in England from the 15th century onwards. The term 
is a reminder that one of the first consequences of the privatization of common land was the 
construction of enclosures designed to protect the enclosed land from incursion and grazing 
by the livestock of the village. The increase in agricultural productivity resulting from the 
implementation of this systemenabled the transfer of manpower from agriculture to industry. 
This third, market route is the one that has been taken by the international community 
to fight against climate change. It has, of course, not taken the form of a privatization of the 
atmosphere,  which  cannot  be  divided  up  into  lots  or  protected  against  greenhouse  gas 
emissions by means of enclosures. Rather it has taken the form of emission permits markets, a 
route explored in the 1960s by the economists Ronald Coase and John Dales (Dales, 1968), 
and  successfully  put  into  practice  in  the  United  States  since  1995  to  combat  acid  rain 
produced largely as a result of  2 SO  emissions from power plants. 
From  a  theoretical  standpoint,  it  is  simple  to  show  that,  in  a  situation  of  perfect 
competition, using a tax or using a system of permits are strictly equivalent. But in a context 
of uncertainty, from the moment when information is no longer perfect, the situation changes 
completely. In a well-known article, Weitzmann showed that the choice between taxes and 
permits  depends  on  the  shape  of  marginal  cost  curves  and  of  marginal  damage  curves 
(Weitzmann, 1974). In the case of climate change, the marginal cost of reductions increase 
rapidly as effort increases while the future damage from climate change is only indirectly 
correlated  with  current  emissions:  it  is  the  accumulation  of  greenhouse  gases  in  the 
atmosphere that counts, more than the annual volume of emissions. This is the reason why 
both Weitzmann and Nordhaus recommend using a tax rather than a system of permits to 
combat emissions. But as we shall see, the options adopted in reality are largely independent 
of debates among economists. Market systems are seen as being able to offer the political 
compromises  essential  to  launching  collective  action.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  they  were 
rapidly imposed. 
 
Box 1. Taxation vs. a permits market: basic economic analysis 
 
This analysis is carried out with the help of Graphs 1 and 2. The cost curve C1 links the cost 
of emissions reduction to the total volume of emissions. Its slope is negative: the right-hand part of the 
curve shows emissions that can begin to be reduced at a lower cost, for example by improving the 
efficiency of energy use. Once these initial reductions have been implemented, more costly operations 
will have to be undertaken, involving for example changes in equipment or organization. And so on, 
as one moves from right to left along the curve. 
  
Figure 1: Emissions price and volume at equibrilium 
 
The curve D1 shows the damage generated by emissions. It has a positive slope. Since climate 
warming is produced by the accumulation of emissions, it is therefore not the first emissions but the 
most recent that have the greatest effect on the climate. Eliminating these gives rise to a higher overall 
social benefit. n the graphs, the slopes of curves C1 and D1 are equal. 
The desirable emissions quantity  1 Q , the “optimal quantity” in economists' terminology, is the 
crossover point of the two curves at  1 A . If one reduces emissions more, to the left of  1 Q , one goes too 
far:  the  cost  of  emissions  reduction  is  higher  than  the  benefit  that  society  will  obtain  from  the 
elimination of marginal damage. Conversely, if one moves further to the right of  1 Q  one loses the 
social benefit that the community would obtain from emissions reductions situated to the right of  1 Q . 
The aim therefore is to reach point  1 A . To get there, two routes are open to the public authorities. 
 
• Introduce a tax  1 P . Economic agents who have a marginal cost of reduction lower than  1 P  
have a financial interest in eliminating their emissions in order to avoid paying the tax. Agents who 
have a marginal cost higher than  1 P  will continue to emit. Indeed it is in their interest to pay the 
carbon tax, which is lower than their cost of reduction. Agents adjust their emissions according to the 
price signal of the tax and bring their emissions to  1 Q .  
• The public authorities can also set the quantities while leaving the market to take care of the 
price. In this case they set the overall emission ceiling  1 Q , which is imposed on all actors in the 
economy. This ceiling represents the total right of use of the atmosphere for storing greenhouse gas 
discharges. It will then be apportioned in the form of permits among emitters, who can either use these 
permits to legally cover their emissions, keep them or sell them on the market. Each actor will decide 
to buy or sell his permits by comparing the market price to his own marginal cost. Those who have a 
marginal cost lower than  1 P  will be sellers, and those who have a marginal cost higher than  1 P  will be 
buyers. The market price will therefore rapidly converge toward  1 P .  
If markets are efficient and if the public authorities are perfectly informed, setting up a market 
system of tradable permits or introducing a tax are strictly equivalent. 
In reality, the markets are not totally efficient. Setting up a tradable permits market entails 
transaction costs that can, in practice, turn out to be higher than the cost of collecting a tax. Moreover, 
if the permit market is too limited or lacks liquidity, it will not give rise to a sufficiently stable price 
signal that the actors would internalize as they would a tax. Hence there are practical conditions to be 
met  in  order  for  the  system  of  tradable  market  permits  to  work.  But  it  is  by  taking  account  of 
uncertainty that it becomes possible to decide in favor of one instrument rather than another. 
In actual fact, the public authority does not know with any certainty either the distribution of 
emissions reduction costs or the distribution of the damage that emissions give rise to. This uncertainty 
can be analyzed by means of Graph 2. A second cost curve C0, situated below C1, has been added. C1 
was the curve anticipated by the public authority. C0 is the real curve which turns out to be lower than 
the anticipated curve (this is generally so in practice). We thus have the elements, following the 
economist Weizman who in 1974 constructed this analytic framework, to evaluate the comparative 
advantages of the two systems. 
 
 
Figure 2: Costs of imperfect information 
 
The optimal point which balances costs and marginal damage reduction is now  0 A . Due to the 
lack of information available, the action taken by the public authority has not led to the optimum. 
 
• If the public authority sets up a quota system, real emissions remain fixed at  1 Q  and the 
market equilibrium price falls to 
*
1 P . This price is lower than  0 P  , which is the optimal price. The 
emissions  1 Q  are higher than the desired emissions  0 Q . The result of this is a loss for the community, 
measured by the area of the triangle T1 (blue hatching).  • If the public authority introduces a tax  1 P , this is higher than the desired price  0 P . The 
reduction effort from then on becomes higher than what is economically desirable. The emissions 
*
1 Q  
are lower than  0 Q  and society suffers a loss measured by the area of the triangle T2 (green hatching). 
 
On our graph, the two areas are the same, since the slope of the cost curve is identical to that 
of the damage curve. This is the only case, in a situation of uncertainty, where the tax and the permit 
system are economically equivalent. If the slope of the cost curve is higher than that of the damage 
curve, the area of T1 is greater than the area of T2, and it is preferable to use a tax. Conversely, if the 
slope of the damage curve is higher than that of the cost curve, in other words, if the damage suddenly 
rises above an emission threshold, T2 is greater than T1, and it is preferable to use permits. 
In the short and medium term, the marginal cost curve is likely to be more steeply sloped than 
that the marginal damage curve. Given existing technologies, there are few or no easy substitutes that 
may be adopted in order to significantly reduce emissions produced from the use of fossil fuels. In 
addition, the amount of damage grows slowly when emissions increase because of the inertia of the 
climate  system.  Hence,  to  minimize  the  costs  of  uncertainty,  some  economists  such  as  William 
Nordhaus recommend introducing a tax rather than a permit market in order to set a price for carbon. 
The preceding reasoning is valid only in the short and medium term. In the long term, if a 
public authority is able to set a credible emissions reduction target, the marginal cost curve flattens out 
and  the  damage  curve  becomes steeper. The  economic  appeal of the  permits system increases, as 
Nicholas Stern reminds us. One can also add that the introduction of a market instrument is the surest 
way  of  disseminating  information  to  all  actors  and  public  authorities  on  the  real  distribution  of 
emissions reduction costs. There are also strong economic arguments in favor of a tradable permits 
market system. 
 
3. The Kyoto protocol's flexibility mechanisms 
 
The first international attempt to price carbon dates from 1992. It was a European 
initiative and took the form of a proposal to the European Commission to gradually institute a 
harmonized tax on industrial  2 CO  emissions in the European Union. It came up against head-
on opposition from industry. It also engendered the hostility of the majority of member states, 
which were disinclined to give up part of their sovereignty regarding taxation, even in the 
name of environmental protection. As a result, in 1997 the Commission formally abandoned 
this project of a harmonized European  2 CO  tax. 
Logically, the European Union defended the principle of a harmonized global tax on 
carbon in the multilateral negotiations that led in December 1997 to the signing of the Kyoto 
protocol. There it came up against the twofold opposition of developing countries hostile to 
any sharing of a constraint and of the US delegation which was in favor of setting a ceiling on 
greenhouse gas emissions and of using a system of internationally-traded emission permits to 
limit the costs. After much discussion, it was this type of architecture that was adopted at the 
signing of the Kyoto protocol in 1997. At the time it was viewed as a victory for the principal 
American negotiator, who was none other than vice-president Al Gore. The European Union 
was  then  fairly  rapidly  converted:  as  of  June  1998,  the  Commission  was  completing  an 
enquiry  process  aimed  at  setting  up  a  European  system  of  permit  trading.  Following  the 
withdrawal  of  the  United  States  from  the  Kyoto  protocol  in  2001,  Europe  paradoxically 
became the world's main propagator of negotiable permit markets. 
The Kyoto protocol commits the group of industrialized countries and countries in 
transition (the so-called “Annex B'' countries) to a market economy to collectively reduce 
their average emissions over 2008 to 2012 by 5% compared to the reference year 1990. It 
thereby restrains the free and unlimited use of the atmosphere which previously prevailed. To limit the cost of the obligation, the protocol makes provisions for “flexibility mechanisms'', 
defined in articles 6, 12 and 17. These are the basis for the carbon markets in existence today. 
Article 17 authorizes, within certain limits, trading of emission rights among Annex B 
countries; the emissions rights are in accordance with the cap obligations set for the 2008-
2012 period. By doing so, it transposes at an international scale the cap and trade system; a 
system which, until then, had only been applied to the power sector in the United States, to 
control emissions from power generation plants. A country which bears high reduction costs 
will be able to meet part of its obligations by buying Kyoto emission rights from a country 
that  is  better  positioned  to  reduce  its  emissions.  Article  17  lays  the  foundations  of  an 
international carbon market among countries having emissions reduction obligations. 
Articles 6 and 12 complement this first mechanism by creating a projects system. The 
idea is to allow countries or voluntary actors capable of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 
obtain  credits  which  can  be  priced  on  the  international  market.  These  credits  should 
financially encourage countries such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and Ukraine  to launch 
emission-reducing  projects  without  waiting  to  be  actually  constrained  by  an  international 
treaty. The purchase of credits by the industrialized countries of Annex B should at the same 
time enable them to reduce the cost of attaining their emission reduction targets. For example, 
it is economically rational to begin by capturing methane from Chinese mines for a dollar for 
every tonne of   avoided rather than look for emission reductions at 80 euro per tonne of   
avoided in western Europe. 
The mechanisms  of the new carbon  economy  have certain  similarities to  those of 
currency  creation.  By  ratifying  the  Kyoto  protocol,  each  country  acknowledges  an 
environmental  debt  constituted  by  emissions  of  the  six  greenhouse  gases  covered  by  the 
protocol. Through the flexibility mechanisms, the moral debt in relation to future generations 
acquires financial substance. It must be settled in carbon currency (emission permits) which 
must be refunded in amounts equal to the emissions. 
 
4. The launch of the European  2 CO  trading system  
 
The European Union chose to prepare for the 2008 launch of the first Kyoto trading 
period by establishing its own emission permits market in January 2005, the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). This program applies to 11,500 industrial installations, 
representing 42% of the European Union's greenhouse gas emissions. It applies only to  2 CO  
(and to a small extent  O N2  from 2008 onward). The sectors covered are electric power -
generating companies (representing over 60% of 2007-allocated quotas) and energy-intensive 
industry, including steel, cement and glass manufacturers. Each installation has been given an 
emissions ceiling instantiated by the  annual allocation of a certain  number of quotas  –each 
quota giving the right to emit a tonne of  2 CO  –which it must not exceed each year. To be in 
compliance, an installation can either reduce its emissions to the level of its ceiling or buy 
















Figure 1 : European industries subject to quotas in 2007 
 
Source: Mission Climat de la Caisse des Dépôts from the CITL. 
 
The European carbon market covers two periods. 2005-2007 was a time of start-up 
and learning. The second, 2008-2012, is the period of obligations under the Kyoto protocol. 
From  2008,  the  European  quota  market  will  therefore  integrate  itself  with  the  flexibility 
mechanisms proposed by the protocol. Within each of these two periods, industries may take 
up unused quotas from one year to cover their emissions for the following year. On the other 
hand, they are not permitted to carry over unused quotas from the first period to the second. 
This so-called “non-bankability” rule between the two periods is crucial for understanding the 
market during its first three years
4. 
With 262 million tonnes of CO2 traded, 12% of the quotas allocated to industry were 
traded in 2005. In 2006, the volume of transactions soared, rising to 818 million tonnes of 
2 CO , nearly 40% of the quotas allocated to industry. It reached 1.4 billion tonnes of  2 CO  in 
2007. These figures mean that the European trading system is by far the largest emission 
permits market in the world. The World Bank estimates that this market captured more than 
80% of the value of the global trade in carbon from 2005 to 2007. As a result, the European 




                                                 
4 For a more complete analysis, see De Perthuis C., Convery F., Ellerman D., The European Carbon Market in Action: 
Lessons from the First Trading Period, Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts, University College of Dublin, Center for 




Figure 2: The world carbon market in 2007 
Source: World Bank. 
 
 
When the market was launched, the price of a tonne of  2 CO  was 7 euros. The price 
initially rose rapidly, under the impact of demand from electric power generating companies, 
and  remained  above  20  euros  a  tonne.  In  spring  2006,  the  market  acquired  the  first  full 
information on real emissions in 2005: during the first year of operation, quotas allocated 
were 4% higher than real emissions. The spot price immediately fell by more than half. This 
first alert was followed by other corrections. The mild wet weather and the fall in the price of 
gas significantly reduced the demand for quotas on the part of power-generating companies 
during the winter of 2006. In 2007, the quota price of the first period was on average below 
one euro a tonne. 
  
Figure 3: The price of carbon on the European market. 
Source: Tendances Carbone monthly bulletin. 
 
The first period allocations were the result of bargaining between industry, the member states 
and the Commission. These involved a moderate constraint for industry except for the electric 
power sector where significant demand for quotas emerged during the first two years. In other 
respects, some countries were manifestly more flexible, indeed more lax, than others in the 
first period allocations. In view of this experience, the Commission adopted a more standards-
based procedure for the second period allocations. Overall, quota allocations were reduced by 
9% in the second period (-15% in France). For this reason, the second period quota price of 
2 CO  was close to 25 euros a tonne in the first half of 2008. The entry of European industry 
into the world recession then triggered a sharp fall of carbon prices at the end of 2008. But the 
banking provisions between the second and the third periods helped the market find a new 
equilibrium at prices over 13 euros a tonne as from the end of April 2009. All major industry 
and finance players now no longer consider carbon to be free in Europe, and expect that it will 
continue to be costly in the future. This is a major achievement.  
At  more  than  20  euros  a  tonne,  most  large  companies  subject  to  quotas take  the 
emissions price into account in their day-to-day management decisions. Studies reveal that 
this has already triggered significant emissions  reductions: in each of the  years 2005 and 
2006, some 75 million tonnes of CO2 are likely to have been abated by industry (Ellerman 
and Buchner, 2008). Although significant, this is not sufficient to radically alter their energy 
choices and orient investment toward less carbon-intensive technologies. 
All  in  all,  Europe  has,  in  three  years,  managed  to  create  a  credible  system  that 
functions  in  a  community  of  27  countries.  These  nations  have  arrived  at  the  necessary 
compromises to overcome their sometimes conflicting interests. Admittedly, this system is 
regularly criticized, particularly among the 12 new member states of the European Union, 
which have been obliged to accept the rules of the carbon market in the name of the acquis 
communautaire. But its legitimacy is strong. The  2 CO  quota trading system benefits from the 
support  of  most  environmental  organizations.  It  is  managed  by  a  competent  community administration that is open externally. Lastly, it is supported by the commitments of heads of 
state who, at the European Council meeting of March 2007, adopted the target of a unilateral 
20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, compared to 1990 levels. For these 
reasons, no one expects a step backwards after 2012: throughout the European continent, the 
era of free carbon emissions has very much come to an end. 
 
5. The international projects market 
 
The other main pillar of carbon finance is the international projects market which has 
developed since 2003 within the framework of the Kyoto protocol's flexibility mechanisms. 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the principal component of this. The CDM 
allows  for  the  crediting  of  emissions  reductions  obtained  through  voluntary  projects 
implemented in developing countries, which are not subject to obligations, to reduce their 
own emissions. Industrialized nations may use credits generated through the CDM to meet a 
portion  of  their  emission  commitments.  The  CDM  provides  the  only  link  between  the 
industrialized countries of the north and the developing countries of the south in international 
climate agreements. 
By the end of 2009, some 4600 CDM projects were registered, of which a little over 
1800 have been approved by the United Nations body responsible for the mechanism. As a 
whole,  these  projects  represent  an  emissions  reduction  potential  of  more  than  2.5  billion 
tonnes of  2 CO  equivalent between now and 2012, thanks to the CDM. In order of size, this is 
slightly more than 1% of world greenhouse gas emissions. Needless to say, this is not hugely 
significant in terms of the overall stakes, but it is unquestionably a first step. 
Looking at the type of projects developed so far provides some surprises. China is 
established as the leading world supplier of CDM credits, with nearly half the market in 2006 
and  2007.  It  is  followed  by  India,  South  Korea  and  Brazil.  This  concentration  of  supply 
results from the disproportionate weight of some fifteen very large-scale projects enabling 
industrial gas emissions (HFC and  O N2 ) from large factories to be reduced at low cost. This 
windfall effect has undoubtedly occurred to the detriment of projects that are more formative 
for the future of energy systems in developing countries. It has, moreover, largely left the 
least developed countries on the sidelines in terms of participation in the CDM. 
Despite its rapid acceleration, the C DM has not had a structuring effect on the 
development of energy infrastructure in developing countries, which are investing massively 
in new installations that will continue to burn fossil fuels over the coming decades. There 
remains therefore much room for progress. Three ways forward are currently being studied: 
providing  more  flexibility  and  incentives  for  the  development  of  small -scale  projects; 
facilitating the grouping together of basic operations into genuine sectoral programs that 
could obtain credits; and finding a way of providing credits for avoided deforestation, an area 
in which some progress was made at the December 2007 climate change conference in Bali, 
Indonesia. 
Once issued, carbon credits linked to Kyoto projects should be given value thr ough 
actors who are willing to buy them to meet their compliance targets.  Voluntary initiatives 
aside, two main types of actors may resort to procuring emissions reduction credits validated 
by the Kyoto system: countries obliged by the Kyoto protocol to re duce their emissions and 
industrial companies subject to emissions constraints. These two types of buyers are found in 
the 60 or so  “carbon funds'' which have been  developed  around the world  following the 
launch of the Prototype Carbon Fund by the World Bank in 1999. The great majority of 
investors are European, followed some way behind by Japanese investors. 
The preponderance of European buyers of Kyoto credits is clearly seen in the setting 
of prices. The value of Kyoto credits is established according to the price of contracts for emission allowances on the European market, reduced by a premium that takes into account 
the specific risks of the emission reduction project. The growth of the European  2 CO  trading 
system has thus greatly contributed to the launch of the Kyoto projects market by providing a 
reliable carbon price for project actors. 
 
6. Carbon markets in post-2012 negotiations 
 
Since  January  2005,  carbon  markets  have  been  rapidly  deployed  on  the  ground, 
whereas international negotiations have not made significant progress. The December 2007 
Bali  conference  in  particular  gave  an  impression  of  irreconcilable  differences  between 
countries. However, even in the event of a setback in international climate negotiations, no 
one  expects  a  return  to  the  situation  prevailing  before  1997,  when  there  was  free  and 
unlimited use of the atmosphere for storing greenhouse gas emissions. Carbon markets will 
continue to function, but in different ways depending on whether or not an international treaty 
on the climate is agreed upon. 
In  January  2008,  the  European  Commission  put  forward  its  “energy  and  climate'' 
package. Measures  concerning the European carbon market  are incorporated into a much 
wider policy targeting three objectives: reducing EU-27 greenhouse gas emissions by 20% 
compared to 1990 levels; raising the proportion of renewable energy used in Europe to 20% 
by 2020; and increasing energy efficiency by 20% within the same time frame. The initiative 
is known as the “three twenties''. 
Regarding greenhouse gas emissions, the energy and climate package firstly reinforces 
the environmental constraint on industry. It aims at moving from a system in which free 
allocation is the rule and auctions the exception to the reverse situation: according to the 
proposal, all allocations for the electric power sector must be auctioned from January 2013 
onward, with a more gradual introduction of auctions for other industries. To help attain the 
20% reduction in total emissions, the European ceiling would have to decrease by slightly less 
than 2% per annum between 2013 and 2020. 
The detailed architecture of the European quota trading system will become clear only 
once  the  outcome  of  international  post-2012  negotiations  is  known.  In  the  event  of  a 
“satisfactory'' post-Kyoto international agreement, European heads of state have committed 
themselves to a 30% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in Europe compared to 1990. In 
such a scenario, the constraints  weighing on European industry would be proportionately 
increased,  but  so  too  would  the  flexibility  mechanisms.  In  the  event  of  an  international 
agreement, the Commission would accept half the additional effort by industry to be covered 
by the purchase of credits from project mechanisms. This has a twofold function: on the one 
hand to serve as a carrot to compensate emerging countries like India and China which are 
benefiting from these project mechanisms; and on the other to limit the rise in emission costs 
and the increase in the price of carbon in Europe. 
The question is of course what counts as a “satisfactory international agreement''. The 
first condition for this is that all industrialized countries participate. A so-called “Copenhagen 
Agreement”,  negotiated  by  28  heads  of  State,  was  tabled  at  the  December  2009  climate 
negotiations in Copenhagen; while receiving wide support, the agreement, negotiated outside 
the UNFCCC framework, does not constitute the official international declaration hoped for.  
In the United States, a voluntary carbon market has been in operation in Chicago since 2001. 
The  Chicago  Climate  Exchange  has  limited  reach  and  the  carbon  price  there  is  low.  In 
January 2009, 10 northeastern American states launched a mandatory carbon market covering 
electric power plants – the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) – and the State of 
California  plans  to  launch  its  trading  scheme  for  greenhouse  gases  by  2012.  RGGI  has received less media coverage than the Californian project, but is more advanced in concrete 
terms.  
Under the presidency of Barack Obama, these regional experiments have every chance 
of merging into a federal system. The US House of Representatives has already passed the 
draft of the "American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009", also called the Waxman-
Markey project, which has to be discussed and approved by the US Senate before entering 
into operation. The draft aims at establishing a broader carbon trading scheme than the one 
operating in Europe, covering 85% of the country's greenhouse gas emissions;  and requiring 
its domestic sources to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases by 17% by 2020 relative to 
2005 levels. This reduction commitment is of similar magnitude to the one adopted by Europe 
(-19% relative to 2005 levels). However, the US effort is much lower in relation to 1990 
levels because the emissions of the European Union declined slightly between 1990 and 2005, 
whereas US emissions increased by 16%. 
  
Conclusion: A fragmented market or one unified by a post-Kyoto 
agreement? 
 
Carbon markets are sometimes presented as alternatives to public action in the face of 
climate change. Such a view is misleading. Carbon markets are instruments through which a 
carbon price emerges, providing strong incentives to economic actors to reduce emissions 
where it is least costly to do so. But by setting emissions ceilings, it is governments which 
determine the amount of emissions reductions and, indirectly, the carbon price needed to 
achieve them. Were European  governments  suddenly to renounce their commitments,  the 
price  of  carbon  would  collapse  and  the  market  would  disappear.  If  governments  act  in 
concertation, the carbon market will gain in depth and effectiveness. If they do not, carbon 
markets  will  become  fragmented  and  therefore  less  effective  both  economically  and 
ecologically. 
Carbon markets also play a key role in international climate negotiations, since they 
facilitate  the  emergence  of  compromise.  The  economic  value  given  to  greenhouse  gas 
emissions allows bargaining that can bring together initially very divergent positions. It was 
this type of compromise that enabled countries like Russia and Ukraine to be brought into the 
Kyoto protocol. For the next stages of international negotiations, three parameters must be 
taken into consideration: the advances made in the frame of the European carbon trading 
system; the benefits that major emerging countries such as China, India and Brazil achieve by 
being  able  to  use  the  international  carbon  market  to  reinforce  their  emissions  reduction 
efforts; and the likely introduction during the coming years of a federal cap on greenhouse gas 
emissions  in  the  United  States.  Without  a  carbon  market,  the  chances  of  a  post-Kyoto 
international agreement would be poor. Thanks to the existence of these markets, the chances 
are possibly higher than the gulf between the positions of different governments would lead 
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